Although I would find it more comforting if something like an objective morality existed, I am convinced that it not only does not exist, but that it cannot exist in principle. As an atheist, I find objective morality inherently impossible to defend, but I believe that theists are equally unable to do so.
A very simple reason for this is that theists must first decide which religion proclaims the objective morality. But how is this decision made? It cannot be based on one of those religions itself, so the only way to decide is based on your own judgment. That is, by definition, subjective. The only difference between the theist and the atheist is that the theist believes in an objective morality, but that belief is subjective and therefore no more valuable than the subjectivity of the atheist.
But even if we could prove that one of the religions is true or that a God exists, morality would still be subjective. Before I explain why, I must first define what I mean by objective morality.
Defining Objective Morality
Something is objective if it is based on real facts and not influenced by personal beliefs or feelings. Under this definition, if murder were objectively wrong, it would remain so even if every person on earth believed it to be right.
However, morality involves more than just identifying what is good or bad; it implies that we ought to do what is good and ought not to do the bad. This may seem like a subtle distinction, but it is crucial because I believe that even if it could be objectively demonstrated what is good and bad, it still cannot be objectively demonstrated that we ought to do the good and ought not to do the bad.
The Euthyphro Dilemma
In Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro the following:
“Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?”1
Option 1: By saying that something is good because God commands it, morality becomes arbitrary, as God Himself can then determine what He deems right or wrong.
Option 2: If you choose the second option, where God commands something because it is good, you run into the problem that good and evil exist independently of God. This means that God is not the source of morality, but merely a messenger.
A common counterargument is that this is a false dilemma. There is supposedly a third option: God is good by nature. But this does not solve the dilemma; one can then ask whether God’s nature is good according to an external standard, or whether “good” is simply that which corresponds to God’s nature.
If you judge the goodness of God according to an external standard, you are back at Option 2: good and evil exist independently of God.
If you say that goodness is identical to God’s nature, then it is a tautology. The statement “God is good” then means the same as “God is God.” The statement no longer carries any substantive meaning. This also leads to circular reasoning:
Question: Why should I do what is good?
Answer: Because it corresponds to the nature of God.
Question: Why must I do that which corresponds to the nature of God?
Answer: Because that is good.
Even if... (The Is-Ought Problem)
But even if you could demonstrate that God is good by nature, we still have not solved the second condition of morality: “Why ought I do that which is good?” Or in this case: why should I act in accordance with God’s nature?
If you say that you must act in accordance with God’s nature because it is in accordance with God’s nature, you return to the logical problems described above. Outside of this context, this problem is known as David Hume’s Is-Ought problem: one cannot simply derive a norm (what we ought to do) from a fact (what is).
Conclusion
In my view, there is no way to demonstrate that an objective morality exists. At the very least, I have yet to hear any solid objections to the Euthyphro dilemma or the Is-Ought problem. If you believe you have them, please let me know in the comments or send me a message!
Plato, Euthyphro 10a. In the original dialogue, Socrates refers to “the pious” (to hosion) and “the gods” (plural), consistent with Greek tradition. However, this makes no difference to the logical structure of the dilemma and its application to monotheism.